Social Security and the American Family by Michael J. Boskin & Douglas J. Puffert





Working Paper No. 2117




We wish to thank Larry Summers for useful suggestions and the Stanford
University Center for Economic Policy Research and the National Bureau
of Economic Research, Inc. for support of this research. Some of
the material in this paper elaborates work presented in M. Boskin,
L. Kotlikoff, D. Puffert and J. Shoven, "Social Security: A Financial
Appraisal Across and Within Generations," NBER Working Paper #1891,
April 1986. The research reported here is part of the WRER's research
program in Taxation. Any opinions expressed are those of the authors
and not those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.NBER Working Paper #2117
January 1987
Social Security and the American Family
ABSTRACT
This paper presents the results of a computer simulation of the
expected present value of iDenefits, taxes, and transfers, rates of
return, and marginal linkage of benefits and taxes for persons of
different income levels and family status. A number of important issues
associated with the "deal" and incentives projected to be offered by the
current social security system for different family situations are
treated: married versus single persons, number of earners in the family
and the division of earnings between them, and the special situation of
widows and divorcees. The results show tremendous variation for
different family situations and often dwarf amounts at stake for most
families in the recent debates over income tax reform.
We pay particular attention to items such as marriage penalties and
subsidies, incentives to postpone divorce and low marginal linkage of
expected benefits to incremental taxes paid by women, whether as second
earners in a family, divorcees or widows.
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Expected Social Security retirement benefits are the largest single
"asset" available to most Americans. Social Security is also the source
of the largest tax burden for a majority of American workers. Because
the program is so large and complex1 it is important to understand the
investment deal it offers persons and families in different situations,
as well as the aggregate financial and economic implications of the
program and any changes in it. Expected benefits depend on a variety of
factors, such as one's marital status, age, sex, age-earnings profile,
length of career, number of children, other income sources in
retirement, etc.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss a number of important
issues associated with the "deal" and incentives projected to be offered
by the current social security system, especially with respect to its
treatment of the family. By treatment of the family, we mean the
expected benefits, taxes, rates of return and marginal benefits per
incremental dollar of taxes paid for persons in different family
situations: married versus single, number of earners in the family and
the division of earnings between them, the special situation of widows
and divorcees, etc.
While a number of authors have commented on various features of the
Social Security system affecting people in these different
situations1, we believe it is worthwhile to refocus attention On
1. See, for example, essays in Burkhauser and Holden (1982)and the
discussion in Boskin, Kotlikoff, Puffert and Shoven (1986).
1these specific issues in light of a number of important factors. Among
these are the substantial changes introduced by the 1983 Social Security
Amendments, the changing actuarial projections used as the intermediate
assumptions in the last few years, the dramatic changes in life
expectancies, and the rapid change of the structure of American families
toward more episodes of divorce, more single person households, and more
common and lengthier widowhood than several decades ago, to name a few.
We begin by pointing out that Social Security offers very different
ex ante "deals" and marginal returns for incremental taxes paid to
persons of different income, family status, age, sex, and income. While
this may or may not be desirable, the extent of the differences is not
widely appreciated.En particular, the fact that a very substantial
fraction of some subgroups in the population receive back virtually
nothing for incremental taxes paid and therefore, social security may
rightly be perceived primarily as a tax, and not a savings scheme, is
among the most important of these problems.
Among the features which treat persons of different family status
differently in Social Security are the following:
1. The progressivity of the benefit formula;
2.Survivors' benefits;
3.Spousal benefits;
4. Rules governing eligibility of divorced persons;
5. The ceiling on Social Security taxable earnings;
6. The taxation of one-half of benefits over a certain income
level for persons receiving benefits;
7. Child survivors' benefits;
8. The person's age cohort reflecting the maturity of the
system, and therefore, their entire tax history.
2Each of these factors interact with the important non-Social Security
features of differential life expectancies for different groups, most
importantly for the issues discussed here, for males and females, and
the differential wage level trajectories typical of males and females in
the labor force.
There is a substantial variation in the typical Social Security
benefits of female new beneficiaries depending upon whether they receive
the spouse benefit, their own worker benefit, or in the case of widows)
survivor benefits, Of new female beneficiaries in 1982, 64% were part
of married couples and 24% were widows. For the former., the most common
benefit was the spouse benefit; for the latter) the survivor benefit.
About two-fifths of women who were ever married receive benefits based
on their own earnings history.
As can be seen from this list of features of Social Security and
other factors which affect the deal and the marginal linkage of benefits
and taxes, the situation is rather complex. In order to clarify these
issues, this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 presents a cursory literature review and a description of
our data and methodology.
Section 3 presents some comparisons among households
with different earnings splits and different levels of earnings. We
examine a single-earner couple and examples of two-earner couples where
the earnings split is two-thirds and one-third between the husband and
wife or fifty-fifty between the husband and wife. We present the
expected present value of taxes paid, benefits received, and transfers,
and therefore, the expected internal rate of return on taxes paid for
three total family earnings level indexed to 1985: $10,000, $30,000 and
$50,000. These are projected for the cohort of persons born in
31945.2Our primary purpose here is not to discuss the
intergenerational issues, but rather the intragenerational issues of
differential treatment of persons in different family status. The
differences often amount to more than the value of a typical family
house.
Also presented in Section 3 is a discussion of the second-earners'
range of zero-marginal return, i.e., for different levels of husbands'
earnings, how much must the wife earn before she begins to receive any
incremental return for the Social Security taxes she pays? We also
discuss single males versus single females, and singles versus couples.
The presence of spousal and survivors' benefits clearly changes the deal
offered to couples versus singles.
Section 4 analyzes the marriage penalty or subsidy, i.e., how a man
and a woman fare under Social Security if they marry relative to how
they fare if they stay single. The amounts involved are substantial,
exceeding the much more hotly debated marriage penalty in the personal
income tax.
Section 5 discusses the situation for widows and divorcees. We
present similar information on the present value of benefits, taxes,
transfers, and rates of return, including those in which the widow
worked or did not work prior to the assumed date of death of the
husband. We also present the various situations defining the range of
earnings widows would make without receiving any incremental Social
2. Boskin, Kotlikoff, Puffert and Shoven (1986) presents details for other
cohorts.
4Security benefits, or for non-working wives, who start work at two-
thirds of their husbands' wage upon widowhood, the age after which they
would receive no incremental Social Security benefits despite payment of
substantial taxes. Analogous results are presented for divorcees. For
the latter, a tremendous incentive exists to postpone divorce until
after ten years of marriage. The financial stake can exceed $50,000.
Section 6 discusses the issue of the marginal linkage of benefits
and taxes in more detail. The relation of the expected present value of
benefits received for an incremental dollar of taxes paid varies
substantially by family status and earnings level.
Section 7 discusses some parallel stories for the cohort born in
1975, given the actuarial projections of the Social Security
Administration, ignoring any potential long-term financial solvency
problems of the system, and accounting for the major changes relative to
the 1945 cohort (i.e., a much larger fraction of women will be assumed
to have worked for the bulk of their life by the time they retire).
Section 8 offers a brief conclusion and summary of the results.
2.The Present Study in Perspective
Several studies have attempted to estimate the "deal" different
households receive or can expect to receive in the future from the
Social Security retirement program. It is well known that the early
cohorts of retirees had very large rates of return on their taxes and
that future retirees, especially wealthy ones, will not fare well
relative to rates of return available on private assets.3
SThe primary contribution of this study is to update the results to
the post-1983 Amendments situation (of the studies cited only ?ellechio
and Coodfellow (1983), Boskin (1986), and Boskin, Kotlikoff, Puffert and
Shoven (1986) do so), allow for recent changes in the actuarial
assumptions to the changing economic and demographic factors, present a
wider range of cases1 examine the marginal linkage between taxes paid
and benefits received, and focus in particular on the situation of women
in these updated cases, supplementing the important work in the
Eurkhauser and Flolden volume.
We use a computer simulation to convert assumptions about
households' wages, expected mortality, and economy-wide growth in real
wages into expected present values of Social Security taxes, benefits,
net transfers, and internal rates of return. We also examine the
marginal linkage between incremental taxes paid and expected present
value of incremental benefits received.4
3. A sample of such studies include Boskin, Avrin, and Cone (1983); Hurd
and Shoveri (1985); Boskin (1986); Pellechio and Coodfellow (1983);
Flowers (1977); Ricardo-Campbell (1977); and several studies in the
book by Burkhauser and Holden (1982), of particular importance because
it focuses on the role of women in the Social Security system as it
existed at the time the essays were written and under various
alternatives. See also Boskin, Kotlikoff, Puffert and Shoven (1986),
and the survey by L. Thompson (1983).
4. Obviously, in order to conduct these analyses various assumptions have
to be made. We consider various aspects of households, i.e., marital
status, birth cohort, the amount of total earnings and its division
between wife and husband. We calculate expected taxes and benefits
using mortality probabilities computed separately for males and females,
and separate mortality tables when different cohorts are used. The
tables used are those prepared for the intermediate assumptions in the
1983 Annual Social Security Administration Trustees Report.
All earnings levels reported in tables below correspond directly to
25 year olds in 1985. We assume that wages for males increase 1%per
63.Comparisons Among Households (1945 Cohort)
Social Security -- bothwher it was introduced and every time it
was expanded -- hasbeen a major vehicle for transferring resources from
the younger, richer working generation to the older, poorer retired
generation. But these transfers do not occur uniformly across different
types of families.Tables 1 and 3 show how the expected present value
of benefits, taxes, and transfers for single men and women of different
income levels and for married couples vary with different levels and
composition of income. In Table 1, we note, moving from single-earner
households to an identical earnings stream split between the couple
reduces the expected present value of benefits and the expected present
value of transfers substantially for all three earnings levels
considered. The "deal" as measured by the internal rate of return on
expected taxes paid worsens as we move toward a more equal division of
the earnings, and obviously, as we move for any type of household to
year of age, and for females one-half percent per year of age, until age
50. Thus, for the 1945 cohort, male wages in 1985 will be about 16
percent higher than earnings levels listed, since the males will be 40
rather than 25, and female wages will be nearly 8 percent higher (for
the same reason). Earnings levels also vary annually with economy-wide
wage growth. We use the Social Security Administration's intermediate
wage growth assumption (roughly 1 1/2% per year).
We estimate the expected taxation of one-half of future benefits to
the extent that that portion of one's benefits plus other adjustedgross
income exceeds the non-indexed threshhold levels of $25,000 for singles
and $32,000 for couples. We use the tax law in existence when this
paper was written. The results would vary somewhat given the reduction
in marginal tax rates in the tax law which is about to be phased in.
For further details, see Boskin, Kotlikoff, Puffert and Shoven
(1986).
7higher earnings levels. For example, a couple with $30,000 (at the 1985
wage index) in which the husband was the sole earner would receive a
2.3% internal rate of return on $136,498 taxes paid, and therefore,
suffer a $27,370 loss discounting benefits and taxes at a 3% real rate
of return. The corresponding numbers for a two-third/one-third and one-
half/one-half split of income, adding to $30,000, are 1.75% and 1.45%
for the rate of return and transfers of -$48,715 and -$54,199. Thus,
for the same earnings levels, we see the pattern repeated. Not only
does the rate of return vary by family type and earnings level but there
is a substantial interaction between the two. For example, for single-
earner households, the rate of return received by a $50,000 earning
household is about one-half that for the $10,000 household (1.95% versus
3.74%), whereas for the household with the equal division of earnings
the comparable numbers are 0.61% versus 3.81%, a five-fold rather a two-
fold ratio. Clearly, the interaction of the spouse benefit and the
incremental taxes paid as the spouse earns a greater amount of taxable
income worsens the deal substantially.
Table 2 reports the range of zero-incremental returns for the 1945
cohort for the second-earner. For the same three earnings levels for
the primary earner, we report the minimum earnings level per year to
receive any incremental return from Social Security taxes paid by the
second earner (rather than Just collecting the spouse's benefit and
"losing" all Social Security taxes paid). Note that this calculation
understates the minimum earnings level necessary for second earners with
intermittent work histories because it is assumed that this 1985
earnings level will continue each year until retirement.5 For those
8who step out of the work force for some considerable length of time, the
numbers would be much larger. As an example, consider the primary
earner who is earning $30,000 per year. If the spouse goes to work, he
or she would have to earn almost $10,000 per year before receiving py
incremental return. In short, the first $9,600 per year of earnings
upon which over $1,000 of taxes would be paid (by the employee and
employer) would result in no incremental return to the Social Security
benefits for the couple. This is another way to view the difference
between the different earnings splits of families.
In short, there is a substantial tax on married women's labor force
participation via the spouse's benefit. Until the married woman's own
earnings history (if any) is sufficient to produce benefits beyond the
spouse's benefit, the entire Social Security payroll tax is a pure tax,
with no corresponding presumption of future incremental Social Security
benefits. Since the Social Security payroll tax for retirement,
survivors and disability exceeds 11% and is expected to rise, this is a
substantial extra tax bite at the margin (we take the usual presumption
that the employee bears both the employer and the employee component of
the tax to be a reasonable first approximation). Under the new income
tax reforms, this raises marginal tax rates about 70% and 40% for those
in the 15% and 28% brackets, respectively.
Table 3 presents a comparison among single-earner couples, single
5. The retirement benefit of the spouse is based on an average indexed
monthly earning which would include a substantial number of years of
coverage.
9males, and single females at various earnings levels. The story is much
the same as that reported above for single-earner versus two-earner
couples, although singles, especially single males fare especially
poorly. The reason why single-earner couples do so well reflects the
extra benefits due to the joint survivor nature of SocialSecurity
benefits for the same taxes paid. Different lifeexpectancies are
responsible for the male and female differences among singles. The
single-earner couple collects the spouse benefit while both are alive,
and survivor benefits are received by a survivingspouse if the single-
earner died first. Clearly, in the case of singles, there are by
definition no survivors to receive such benefits. Hence, theexpected
present value of taxes paid is quite similar at each earnings level for
each of the three types of households, the expectedpresent value of
benefits differs enormously.
For example, at the $30,000 level the expectedpresent value of
taxes is about $136,000 for single males and single-earnercouples and
only a few thousand dollars less for single females.6 However, the
expected present value of benefits ranges front $52,000 for single males
to $109,000 for the single-earner couple.
In brief summary, these tables reveal enormous differences- in the
expected present value of benefits and rates of returns on taxespaid to
different family types at each earnings level and theimportant
6. The difference is due to assumptionsconcerning how earnings rise with
age and mortality probabilities.
10interaction of family type and earnings level in determining the "deal0
various families get from Social Security. While these data are
interestingand instructive, we need to probe more deeply into the
situation facing widowed and divorced persons. This is especially true
because of the likelihood that they will be receiving benefits which are
quite low, that they nay well be the group in the population most likely
to be poor in old age,7 and because changing family conditions and
life expectancies in the U.S. render the treatment of widows and
divorced persons increasingly important in an evaluation of the adequacy
and cost-effectiveness of Social Security benefits.
4.Marriage and Children
Social Security creates important incentives and provides various
subsidies or penalties to family creation and dissolution. For example,
there is a huge financial stake in staying married for ten years for
those contemplating divorce after a few years of marriage (detailed more
fully in Section S). Likewise, Social Security provides some auxiliary
benefits for children, e.g., child survivor benefits. But because of
the evolution of the system, these same children will in the future most
likely pay much more in taxes than they will receive in benefits.
Finally, because Social Security provides spousal survivor benefits,
one-half of benefits are taxable under the progressive individual incone
tax, and a spouse's benefit, a single male and a single femaleS
7. See Boskin and Shoven (1986).
11contemplating marriage may face a marriage penalty or subsidy.
Table 4 presents calculations of this marriage subsidy orpenalty
for various combinations of the (newly married) husband's and wife's
earnings levels assuming that both spouses continue working on the same
earnings path. One very important Social Security subsidy is
demonstrated in the entries in the table with zero for the Wife's
Earnings and the column marked Wife Stops Working. In each of these
situations, the couple gets a subsidy given by the spouse's benefit, and
avoids the tax payments. The subsidy exceeds $50,000 invirtually every
case. Thus, these couples do much better under Social Security married
than as singles. While the wife stopping te-workupon marriage is an
extreme case, we present these numbers to indicate the value of that
"option" to the married couple over its lifetime. For those couples
when both spouses continue to work and the wife'searnings are
sufficient to generate her own worker's benefits, the table also
demonstrates that higher income taxes paid on a portion of Social
Security benefits more than offsets the extra value of the survivor's
benefit based on the husband's (possibly high)earnings. This penalty
can amount to $9,000 or $10,000 when discounted at 3%, considerablymore
when discounted at lower rates. This sum is modest relative to the
subsidies to the non-working spouses.
That is not the end of the story, however. Most of thosesingles
who marry will have children, and they in turn, willprobably ay
considerably more in taxes than they receive back in benefits. While
this is unlikely to be of major concern in marriage orfertility
decisions, it is interesting to note the expected change in family
finances, including the impact from the children's taxes and benefits.
Such hypothetical scenarios are presented in Table 5. For several
12combinations of parents' earnings and children's expected earnings, we
see that the "bad deal" the children get offsets the subsidy to
nonworking spouses and substantially increases the marriage penalty for
working spouses. The table presumes that our hypothetical singles are
from the 1945 cohort, marry and (for simplicity) have two children, one
male, one female in 1975. We assume that the children have one earner
with the same relative earnings as their father.8 Since each future
couple has two sets of parents, we attribute one-half of the deal to
each child in this couple.
Social Security provides various incentives and redistributions
because of its many rules and features, such as the spouse benefit, the
survivor benefit, taxation of individuals (as opposed to families), etc.
In some cases, as documented above, the redistribution is large relative
to the disputes over features of the personal income tax. Some of the
marriage subsidies are much larger than the annual small marriage
penalty in the income tax. The marriage penalties, and poor deal for
children, in combination, also can be many times the marriage penalty in
the income tax. Whether the marginal incentives are sufficient to
change behavior, such as labor force participation and family formation
and dissolution is less obvious. Clearly, some of the incentives, such
as staying married a tenth year if contemplating divorce after nine
years of marriage, are likely to be so strong as to affect behavior
noticeably. The spouse benefit rendering the payroll tax a pure tax
with no incremental return, undoubtedly reduces the labor supply of
8. Note, that this means the negative transfers are the smallest for any of
the family patterns.
13married women. Other incentives exist, butmay only affect behavior
slightly, if at all.
5.Widowhood and Divorce
Tables 6 and 7 present comparable information to thatpresented
above for archetypical situations for widowed and divorcedwomen. While
comparable information could be generated for widowers and divorcedmen,
they are, at least historically, of somewhat less interest given the
much higher male labor force participation rates than that for females.
The projected treatment of widows born in 1945 at variousearnings
levels and discounted to constant 1985 dollars revealssome interesting
facts. Our archetypical situation contemplates a widow who loses her
husband when they are both age SO. The expectedpresent value of
benefits include survivor benefits where applicable and retired worker
benefits where applicable. The present value of taxes, ofcourse,
includes taxes paid by the husband before his death. Ascan be seen by
comparing Tables 6 and 1, widows who lose their husbands at relatively
early ages get a much poorer internal rate of return than persons in
couples of comparable earnings levels. We assume that in the case of
the single earner being the husband that the widow doesnot go back to
work. Widows who lose their husbands at age 50 almostcertainly would
not earn enough to receive retired worker benefits in excess of their
survivor benefits. Hence, Table 6 substantially overstates their rate
of return because it excludes any taxes paid beyondage SO if the widow
goes back to work prior to retirement. We also ignore the possibility
of remarriage for the purpose of this calculation.
The rates of return for widows in the middle andupper earnings
14range are quite low, even negative for those who were working and will
continue to work after their husbands' deaths. To take the example of
the one-half/one-half earnings split, discounted at a real 3% rate and
adding up taxes paid at the same rate, the widow who is from a couple
where each of the earners earned $25,000 adjusted for inflation and
productivity growth as of 1985, would lose $144,000 because she and her
deceased husband paid in taxes of $204,000 and received back slightly
less than $61,000 in expected present value of benefits. The internal
rate of return is approximately minus one-half of one percent. Only in
the case of single-earner low-income households do widows receive a rate
of return comparable to our assumed 3% real discount rate.
In comparing similar columns and rows from Table 6 with those in
Table 3, several important facts must be noted. First, the widows get a
much worse "deal".9 Next, Table 3 is completely ex ante, i.e.,
everything is in expected value terms. Table 6 is somewhat ex post,
since we have presumed that the widow and her husband have both survived
to age 50 and use mortality probabilities of 1 at age 50 for the husband
and the life table mortality probabilities beyond age 60 for the
surviving wife. For single-earner couples, widows may begin work but
will not be able to work enough to increase her benefits beyond the
spousal survivor benefit. The fact that she will pay substantial taxes
with no return in benefits will make her worse off than the table
actually suggests. The same is true for the two-third/one-third
earnings split, i.e., continuing to work at the same presumed earnings
9. Note, however, Table 1 includes the case of early widowhood weighted by
its probability.
15level the widow will get more as a survivor than as a retiredworker,
and hence gets nothing for incremental taxes paid for theremainder of
her work life. In the case where each of thespouses was earning half
the income, the widow will get more as a retired worker if shecontinues
to work at the same earnings level than as a survivor.
Again, for the 1945 cohort, we present the range of zero
incremental benefits for widows and divorced women. Theseare presented
for three presumed (1985 indexed) husbands' earnings levels:$10,000,
$30,000, and $50,000. The data are presented in twoways: First, the
minimum earnings level necessary to receive an incrementalreturn and, second
the latest age at which widowhood could occur to receivean incremental
return if the widow first begins work at two-thirds of the husband's
wage rate (slightly higher than the average ratio of female to male
wages). Thus) in the first panel we note that for a husband'searning
level of $10,000, a woman who is widowed atage 50 would need to earn
$7,500 in 1985 indexed earnings per year for the remainder of her work
life to receive any incremental return whatsoever. All taxespaid under
$7,500 (indexed) would result in zero incremental return. Theanalogous
numbers for widows of husbands earning $30,000 ayear and $50,000 a year
are indeed large: $21,000 and $22,000 respectively. Thus, a widow who
returns to work full-time for the remainder of her work life andearns
up to $20,000, responsible for joint employee and employer payroll taxes
for retirement of well over $2,000 a year would bereceiving no
incremental return.
Another way to look at the problem is to ask what is the latestage
at which widowhood could occur (and the widow who begins work at two-
thirds of her husband's wage, subject to thewage growth conditions
16discussed) to receive an incremental return. For the three earnings
level, these ages are 39, 41, and 45. Thus, only those who are widowed
quite young in their life, do not remarry and go back to work earning
two-thirds of their husband's wages over their remaining work life will
receive any incremental return. The rate of return will still be quite
modest, because the contributions by and on behalf of her husband will
generate no return as she will switch from survivor benefits to retired
worker benefits.
The table also presents analogous information for divorced women.
Recall that women who are married for less than ten years do not "vest"
in the husband's earnings records. Correspondingly, any given earnings
history may generate more than one divorced person's benefit if there
were two or more marriages that lasted ten years or more, apparently a
growing phenomenon in the United States. Women do not lose from
remarriage, as they can get benefits based on a former spouse's earnings
history. The corresponding earnings levels for women married for more
than 10 years, and hence entitled to the spouse benefit based on their
ex-husband's entire earnings history, to receive any incremental
benefits at all are $2,900, $9,600 and $10,000, considerably less than
the case for widows.10
Correspondingly, the latest age at which divorce could occur
(assuming no remarriage) and the divorced worker go to work at two-
thirds of the husband's earnings rate and receive y incremental
benefits are 51, 49, and 54 respectively. Of course, if the woman's
10. They need only achieve a retired worker benefit equal to one-half that
of their husband to switch from a spouse benefit to their ownretirement
benefit.
17earnings record is considerably smaller than two-thirds of theprojected
earnings of the divorced husband, these ages would beconsiderably
younger. Recall that many divorced spouses receive no benefits
whatsoever from their spouses earnings history becausethe marriage
lasted less than the required time. Thesepersons, of course, receive
incremental benefits as soon as theygo to work.
These data reveal several interesting facts.First, there is an
enormous incentive to postpone divorce until the 10year "vesting"
period is completed. For example, in a one-earnercouple with the
husband earning $30,000 indexed to 1985, a divorceafter nine years of
marriage would cost the divorcee about $35,000-$40,000 discountedto
1985! This is more than the median net financialassets of U.S.
households.
The treatment of widows and divorcees inan era when life
expectancies are growing, especially more rapidly forwomen than men
conditional on reaching ages; divorce and
remarriage have become much more prevalent; and theenormous variation
in the treatment of different individuals whosecondition may differ
marginally in terms of when their widowhood or divorceoccurred, suggest
that continued pressure will be placedupon Social Security to reform
the nature of its taxation and benefitpayments to families and
individuals.
6. The Marginal Linkage Between Benefits and Taxes
We have presented several types of information abovefor various
types of households, including widows and divorcees, traditionalone-
earner and two-earner couples, single males andsingle females. Most of
18that information concerns the expected present value of total taxes
paid, expected present value of total benefits received, and therefore,
the lifetime transfer, as well as the internal rate of return, on
expected taxes paid. We have discussed some issues of marginal linkage,
such as the age at which or the earnings at which a person would start
to earn their retired worker benefits and begin to receive an
incremental return on their taxes, switching over from spousal, survivor
or divorced person's retirement benefit.
It is instructive to note the discounted expected marginal benefit
formarginal taxes paid (we assume the extra taxes are spread over the
lifetime in proportion to earnings). We present this information in
Table8 to give some idea of the marginal linkage for archetypical
couples and singles to complement the information presented for
divorcees and widows. For each of our archetypical earnings level, the
table considers for male or female the discounted expected extra
benefits paid for a dollar of extra taxes spread over the lifetime.
These data are for the cohort born in 1960, who have recently entered
the labor force, and are discounted to 1985 dollars with a 3% real
discount rate. Four cases of family status are presented: one-earner
couple, two-earner couple where each is presumed to earn one-half of the
earnings,single males, and single females. Some remarkable facts
emerge.
Innocase is the marginal linkage as high as one. Nobody gets
backan incremental dollar for the incremental tax paid. The figures
presented in Table 8 range from a marginal linkage as low as 12 cents on
the dollar for a female in a high wage two-earner couple and 15 cents on
the dollar for a single male of middle income to 73 cents on the dollar
for a low income male in a one-earner couple. Note that for some of
19the entries in the table, the particular case involved is at themaximum
tax, hence, there can be no additional taxes considered as part of this
experiment. Note also that in a one-earner couple, the female receives
back nothing for an incremental dollar of taxes paid. The female would
have to earn a substantial amount of earnings togenerate expected
Social Security benefits in excess of the spouse's benefit thecouple
receives independent of any earnings she may produce. For two-earner
couples, the discounted expected incremental benefit per incremental tax
paid differs for males and females. The extra linkage to male taxes for
a couple involve the joint survivor annuity nature of Social Security
benefits in the single-earner case and the survivors benefits for the
wife in the two-earner case.
The reduced linkage for two-earner wives occurs because she
collects survivors benefits rather than retired worker benefits after
her husband dies.
There are many reasons why we might be interested in marginal
linkage in addition to or instead of total returns. First, to the
extent that the complicated system eventually becomes understood,
it is the marginal linkage that determines the extent to which Social
Security's payroll tax will be thought of as a tax rather than forced
saving. To the extent that it is thought of as a tax, it will
substantially increase the effective marginal tax rate on labor
earnings, worsening the labor market distortion caused by higher
11. This may be more reflective of a person getting close to retirement,
attempting to gather information and calculate what their benefits will
be under different stages of retirement and continued earnings levels
than for the general population.
20marginal tax rates. Finally, equity may be thought of as equal
treatment of people at the margin, as well as on average. We make no
claim for this, but identical treatment of people at the margin can lead
to vastly different treatment of people on average as well as vice
versa. We merely present the numbers for additional information.
7. Evolution of the System
Tables 9, 10 and 11 present some comparable information to that
presented earlier for a later cohort, those born in 1975. Obviously,
projecting the future over the lifetimes of these individuals and
families is subject to a greater range of error than for the younger
cohorts. Among the reasons are the potential financial solvency
problems that Social Security may face in the future, which include the
expected long-term actuarial deficit in OASDI which may become larger
due to the reduced reflow of income credited to Social Security when the
new tax bill passes (which will lower marginal tax rates and hence the
tax rate applicable to one-half of Social Security benefits received by
well-off retirees); and1 indeed, Social Security's retirement and
disability funds are scheduled to accrue immense surpluses from around
1990 to 2020 which are needed if we are to avoid drastic tax increases
when the baby-boom generation retires. Of course, we have no guarantee
that we will be able to accrue such massive surpluses (Boskin (1986)
estimates that they will accumulate to a size approximately that of the
entire national debt). There may be political pressure to use the
surplus to bail out Medicare, to raise benefits, to lower taxes, etc.
Still, we present these data as if the Social Security Administrtion's
economic and demographic intermediate projections will hold, and the
system will have sufficient funds so that tax rates and benefit formulae
21remain as now scheduled. We also use the current tax law rather than
the one about to be phased in.
In Table 9, we first note that the lower dollar figures reflect
primarily 30 years of additional discounting. The absolute scale of the
system in fact expands with increases in average wages. The earnings
levels presented have increased with real wages as well, so that a
person in this cohort at age 45 in 2020 will be receiving much higher
wages than the 1985 wage index presented here, e.g., $30,000 indexed to
1985 would correspond to over $50,000 by 2020. These are still constant
1985 dollars; we choose this way of presenting the data tocompare
persons of approximately the same position in the income distribution.
Note also that the retirement age under current law will have risen from
66 to 67 for this cohort relative to the 1945 cohort, that life
expectancy has increased substantially, real wages have increased, OASI
tax rates are somewhat higher, and the benefits would be taxed at higher
tax brackets under the existing income tax (but not under the tax reform
about to be passed --whetherthat will be the tax law in effect when
these persons retire is highly unlikely). The pattern of rates of
return is quite similar for the different types of family and the
different earnings level. Tables 9 and 10 reflect a similar qualitative
pattern, despite the 30 years of additional discounting making the
numbers smaller, to the corresponding Tables 1 and 6. As earnings
levels increase, rates of return decrease and lifetime transfers become
large negative amounts. As we move from single earner to two earner
couples, rates of return decline substantially. Comparing Tables 9 and
10, with the same caveats we used in the comparison of Tables 1 and 6
(the partial ex post nature of treatment of widows who are presumed to
22survive to age 50 with their husbands), suggests that the rates of
return for widows are much lower, and the transfers somewhat smaller
(including larger negative transfers) than those for the couples
presented in Table 9.The striking feature is that women widowed in
middle age are projected to do very poorly under Social Security into
the indefinite future under current law.
Table 11, similar to Table 7, but in this case for the 1975 cohort,
presents comparable information concerning the second earner or
divorcee's minimum earnings level to receive incremental returns, the
same information for widows, and the latest age at which widowhood or
divorce could occur, subject to our assumptions, andany incremental
returns be received on the taxes paid by working widows or divorced
women. The pattern is quite similar to that reported in Table 7.
Widows need substantial earnings levels to receiveany incremental
return, i.e., to switch from the survivor benefit to their ownretired
worker benefit. A widow whose husband has received (in 1985 adjusted
and indexed dollars) $30,000 per year would have togo back to work at
age 50 for the remainder of her work life (assumed to be until age 67)
earning $22,800 a year in order to receive any incremental return.
Similarly, the same woman would have to be widowed no later than age 40
if she went to back to work at two-thirds of her husband's earnings
level before she received any incremental return. Analogous data are
presented for divorcees and for those with husbands with different
earnings levels.
Again, these data reveal the substantial variation in the treatment
of divorced and widowed women, depending upon such things as theage at
which these events occur, as well as their husbands' or ex-husband's
earnings, andhighlightone of the major issues involved in debates over
23earnings sharing as a possible Social Security reform.
8. Conclusion
We have presented the results of a computer simulation of the
expected present value of benefits, taxes, and transfers, and rates of
return, and marginal linkage of benefits and taxes for persons in
various income levels and family status. The most striking feature is
the enormous variation in the treatment, both in total and at the
margin, Social Security offers each of these archetypical family types.
Perhaps this variation is desirable and warranted; still, it has not
been systematically presented as an optimal design for the system given
the magnitude of variation which we have derived.
These results do point out the tremendous amounts at stake for
various family types in the Social Security system and any potential
reforms in it. Often these amounts dwarf any conceivable changes in tax
burdens under the individual income tax. For many groups in the
population, the amount of the expected value of the transfers involved
exceeds the median value of a home.
Because Social Security is so important, large and complex,
information such as this, despite a history of related studies under
earlier actuarial assumptions and law, seems not to have worked itsway
to the general public discourse concerning the efficiency and equity of
the design of the Social Security system. We hope these results will
contribute to a better understanding of how the current Social Security
retirement system, as it is projected into the future, is likely to
affect families of different types and circumstances.
24Table 1
Comparison Across Divisions of Household Earnings for
1945 Cohort, Various Earnings Levels
(1985 dollars discounted at rate 3% to 1985)
Total Family Earnings Level
(at 1985 wage index)























































Second Earners' Range of Zero Incremental Return
(1945 Cohort)







In this simulation, both earners' wages increase at the maleage profile of
wages.
26Table 3
Comparison Among Single-earner Couples,
Single Males, and Single Females of
1945 Cohort, Various Earnings Levels
(1985 dollars discounted at rate 3% to 1985)
Earnings Level (at 1985 wage index)
Family Type 10,000 30,000 50,000
Single-earner Couple
P.V. Benefits 62,679 109,128 100,503
P.V. Taxes 48,951 136,498 140,253
P.V. Transfer 13,727 -27,370 -39,750
Rate of Return 3.74% 2.30% 1.95%
Single Male
P.V. Benefits 29,913 52,282 48,532
P.V. Taxes 48,951 136,498 140,253
P.V. Transfer -19,038 -84,216 -91,721
Rate of Return 1.42% -0.25% -0.60%
Single Female
.
P.V. Benefits 40,306 71,715 69,590
P.V. Taxes 46,901 130,802 144,723
P.V. Transfer -6,595 -59,087 -75,133
Rate of Return 2.55% 1.13% 0.68%
27Table 4
Marriage Subsidy or Penalty
(1945 cohort; 1985 dollars discounted at 3% to 1985)
Husband's Wife's Wife Keeps Working Wife Stops Working
Earnings Earnings (Change in Benefits— Change in Change inChange in Level Level Change in Net Transfer) benefits taxes transfer
$40,000 $40,000 -8,749 -25,814 -117,089 91,275 20,000 -4,471 -14,568 -69,496 54,928 0 54,388 - -
$30,000 30,000 -9,551 -25,305-103,170 77,865 15,000 3,214 -2,051-52,122 50,071 0 56,846 - - -
$20,000 20,000 -4,656 -18,672 -69,514 50,842 10,000 9,422 6,584 -34,748 41,332 0 47,050 - - -
28Table 5
"Deal" for Family (Including Estimated Treatment of Children)
From Marriage and Children
















value of child survivor benefits.
17,715
29Table 6
Treatment of WidOWSa of
1945 Cohort, Various Earnings Levels
(1985 dollars discounted at rate 3% to 1985)
Total Family Earnings Level
























































I.e., widows who lose their husbands at age 50.
b
Includes taxes paid by husband before his death.
30Table 7
Widows' and Divorced Women's Range of Zero Incremental Benefits
(1945 Cohort)
Husband's Earnings Level: 10,000 30,000 50,000
Widow's Minimum Earnings Level
a to Receive an Incremental Return
7,500 21,000 22,000
Latest age at which widowhood occurs, 39 41 45
and widow first begins work at 2/3 of
husband's wage, to receive an
incremental return
.
Divorced woman's minimum earnings level
to receive an incremental return
2,900 9,600 10,000
Latest age at which divorce occurs, and 51 49 54
divorced woman first begins work at 2/3
of husband's wage,5to receive an
incremental return
a Inthis simulation, both earners' wages increase at the male age profile of
wages.
31Table 8
Discounted Expected Marginal Benefitper Marginal Taxes Paid,
with Extra Taxes Spread Over Lifetime,











































Comparison Across Divisions of Household Earnings for
1975 Cohort, Various Earnings Levels
(1985 dollars discounted at rate 3% to 1985)
Total Family Earnings Level
























































Treatment of WIdOWSa of
1975 Cohort, Various Earnings Levels
(1985 dollars discounted at rate 3% to 1985)
Total Family Earnings Level
(at 1985 wage index)










P.V. Transfer -3,649 -34,115









P.V. Transfer -10,087 -51,985










P.V. Transfer -11,243 -55,500 -105,858
Rate of Return 1.65% 0.16% -0.69%
a
I.e., widows who lose their husbands at age 50.
b
Includes taxes paid by husband before his death.
34Table 11
Range of Zero Incremental Return for Second Earners, Widows, and Divorced Women
(1975 Cohort)
First Earner's or Husband's Earnings Level: 10,000 30,000 50,000
Second Earner's or Divorced Woman's minimum
earnings level to receive an incremental returna
2,900 9,600 10.000
Widow's minimum earnins level to receive
an incremental return
7,600 22,800 26,500
Latest age at which widowhood occurs, and 40 40 42
widow first begins work at 2/3 of husband's
wage, to receive an incremental return -
Latest age at which divorce occurs, and 52 50 55
divorced woman first begins work at 2/3 of
husband's wage, to receive an incremental returna
a
In this simulation, both earners' wages increase at the male age profile of
wages.
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